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Abstract 
The choice of the rate at which one should discount the long-term benefits of mitigating 
climate change is highly controversial. Both the level and the slope of the term structure of 
discount rates have been discussed intensively in relation to the determination of the social 
cost of carbon. Although some of the parameters of the problem are ethical and outside the 
scope of economic analysis, we claim that there are converging and convincing arguments in 
favor of using an annual real risk-free discount rate going from around 4% to around 1% for 
maturities going from 0 to infinity. Investing in climate mitigation yields highly uncertain 
future benefits. This should also be taken into account in the selection of the discount rate, 
though the appropriate approach is highly controversial. 
 
Keywords: Climate change, sustainable development, valuation of environmental assets, 
value of statistical life. 
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1. Introduction	
How should one compare benefits occurring at different time horizons? A tradition has 
developed over the last two centuries to make them comparable by discounting.1 The 
discounted (or present) value of a future benefit is the immediate benefit that is considered to 
be socially equivalent to that future benefit. An action is considered desirable if its Net 
Present Value (NPV), i.e., the sum of the present value of the benefits and costs that the action 
generates, is greater than zero. But although discounting and NPV are universally accepted 
tools to evaluate investment projects and public policies, there is still much controversy about 
which discount rate should be used in practice, particularly for the distant future.  
The absence of consensus on this question is critical for many important applications from 
climate change to the preservation of natural resources, the evaluation of pension-fund 
liabilities, and the speed at which public debts should be reduced in the western world. 
Experts and evaluators are well aware that the discount rate is a key parameter driving the 
evaluation of actions having long-lasting impacts. Indeed, the present value of 1 million 
dollars received in 200 years is equal to either 137 000 dollars or 1 dollar depending upon 
whether one uses a discount rate of 1% or of 7%, these rates being within the range suggested 
by different experts. The emergence of global challenges to the sustainability of human 
growth has put pressure on economists to tell the scientific truth, if it exists, about which 
discount rate to use for long-run costs and benefits. The objective of this paper is to 
summarize the recent key findings and the remaining disagreements on this question. 
The discount rate and the market interest rate translate our collective values towards the future 
into key economic variables. Societies with a low discount rate value the future more than 
societies with a larger discount rate, in a way that is made precise below. The way we 
discount long-term benefits expresses our responsibilities towards future generations. 
Common wisdom suggests that our market economy is too short-termist; it does not 
sufficiently value the long-term impacts of our actions. This suggests that people use discount 
rates that are too large compared with what would be desirable from the point of view of 
intergenerational welfare. Yet this statement has never been seriously tested, probably 
because there is no consensus about what would be the socially desirable level of the discount 
rate.  
                                                 
1 See for example Moog and Bösch (2013) who provide an interesting overview of the history of thought on 
discounting in German forestry. 
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We must recognize that economics cannot provide a full answer to this question, which 
involves deep ethical issues. Investing for the future implies a transfer of consumption from 
current generations to future generations. In a growing economy, this means transferring 
consumption from the poor to the wealthy. If we recognize a collective ethical concern in 
favor of reducing inequalities, the discount rate can be seen as the minimum rate of return of 
the investment that is required to compensate for the increased intertemporal inequality the 
investment generates. The larger our aversion to inequality, the larger the discount rate. This 
is the essence of the famous Ramsey (1928) rule, which has become a focal point of the recent 
debate on discounting. Even though economists may document individual aversion to 
inequalities (e.g., by observing pro-social behavior in practice and in the lab), we have no 
unique legitimacy to determine our degree of inequality aversion at the collective level, which 
is a purely ethical parameter.  
Although this controversy originates mostly from environmental issues, it is in essence a 
pricing question. Without surprise, the modern theory of finance and asset valuation provides 
key elements for determination of the discount rate. However, this theory has primarily 
examined the short-term pricing of assets, interest rates, and risk. It remains a challenge to 
expand the theory to explore its consequences for long time horizons. Finance scholars are 
interested in explaining the formation of the interest rate for a typical three month maturity, 
but we want to determine the socially desirable interest rate to be used for maturities 
expressed in centuries! Another challenge when using modern finance theory for our purpose 
is that the simplest versions of the theory fail to explain interest rates and risk prices observed 
on financial markets.  
Following the tradition of the literature that we survey, in most of the paper we make the 
unrealistic assumption that the projects we want to evaluate are risk-free. Thus, we will 
characterize the determinants of the risk-free discount rate. But one should recognize that 
most actions have uncertain short- and long-term impacts. In the finance literature, this 
recognition led to the characterization of risk-adjusted discount rates, which we examine in 
Section 7. 
2. Discounting	in	practice	
2.1. Market	interest	rates	
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Firms use their costly capital to invest. Consider a firm implementing a single investment 
project. This project is profitable if and only if its return is larger than the firm’s cost of 
capital. To illustrate, consider a firm with a safe project. Competition on the capital market 
implies that the firm will offer its lenders a return on their capital that is not different from the 
risk-free market interest rate. To generate a profit, the return to the project must exceed this 
rate. Thus, firms should use the market interest rate as the discount rate to evaluate their safe 
investment projects. When projects are risky, the (weighted average) cost of capital to finance 
them will be adjusted for risk and so will their associated discount rate (see Section 7). 
Observed market interest rates are thus a good indicator of the discount rate used by firms. 
These rates have fluctuated through time and across countries. We have good estimates of real 
interest rates for a large set of western countries since the late nineteenth century. In Table 1, 
we present the average realized real returns of sovereign bills and bonds and market equity 
over the period 1900-2006 for 11 countries.2 Sovereign bills and bonds are considered the 
safest assets of the economy. Bills are debt contracts with maturities not exceeding one year; 
bonds may have maturities up to 50 years. It is important to observe that the interest rate is 
maturity-dependent, i.e., there is a term structure for the rate of return to safe assets. Usually, 
it is increasing: Safe projects with a longer maturity yield a larger cost of capital and a larger 
discount rate. For the very short maturities corresponding to bills, real rates averaged 1% 
during the last century in the United States, and were even negative in France, Italy and Japan. 
Sovereign bonds with a 10 year maturity generated a slightly larger average real return, 
around 2% for the United States. 
Table 1: Annualized real returns, 1900 to 2006 
 Bill Bond (10 
year) 
Equity 
Australia 0.6% 1.3% 7.8% 
Canada 1.6% 2.0% 6.3% 
Denmark 2.3% 3.0% 5.4% 
France -2.9% -0.3% 3.7% 
Italy -3.8% -1.8% 2.6% 
Japan -2.0% -1.3% 4.5% 
Netherlands 0.7% 1.3% 5.4% 
United Kingdom 1.0% 1.3% 5.6% 
Sweden  1.9% 2.4% 7.9% 
Switzerland 0.8% 2.1% 5.3% 
USA 1.0% 1.9% 6.6% 
Sources: Morningstar and Dimson, Marsh and 
                                                 
2 All interest and discount rates in this paper are reported as annual percentages. 
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Staunton (2002). Reproduced from Gollier (2012). 
  
We conclude that market forces induced the private sector to use a rate between 1% and 2% to 
discount risk-free projects during the last century, averaging over the business cycle. 
2.2. Government	evaluation	
Several countries routinely use benefit-cost analysis to evaluate public decisions including 
transportation projects and environmental and safety regulations. Some have published 
guidance to standardize evaluation methods, including the discount rate.  
In the United States, the guidance (OMB 2003) recognizes that the discount rate should 
depend on whether a regulation reduces investment or consumption. The return to investment 
(opportunity cost of capital) is larger than the rate at which consumers trade current for future 
consumption (social rate of time preference) because of taxes on capital income.3 OMB 
suggests that the ‘shadow price of capital approach’, which converts reductions in investment 
to forgone future consumption increments and discounts these at the social rate of time 
preference, is analytically preferred but impractical because of uncertainty about the extent to 
which a regulation displaces investment versus consumption. As a default, it requires that 
projects be evaluated using two rates: 7% and 3%. The first is the average before-tax rate of 
return to private capital, taken as an estimate of the opportunity cost of capital. The second is 
the average return to 10 year government bonds, taken as an estimate of the social rate of time 
preference. For projects with intergenerational effects, OMB (2003) suggests supplementing 
these two rates with an additional, “lower but positive discount rate.” This is justified by 
arguments about the illegitimacy of discounting future generations’ well-being and 
uncertainty about future growth. 
In the United Kingdom, the discount rate is based on the Ramsey rule (described in Section 
4). The first term ( = 1.5%) is interpreted as a combination of pure time preference and risk 
of catastrophe (under which the future effects would be eliminated or severely altered). The 
inequality-aversion parameter  is set to 1 and the economic growth rate g estimated as 2%, 
yielding a discount rate of 3.5%. For maturities greater than 30 years, the guidance specifies a 
step-wise decreasing discount rate motivated by uncertainty (Weitzman 1998, 2001, Gollier 
                                                 
3 Differences in risk may also contribute to observed differences, but not to the risk-free rates. 
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2002). The discount rate is 3.0% for years 31-75 and it falls to 1% for periods more than 300 
years in the future. 
In France, the recommended discount rate is also decreasing with maturity. Following the 
recommendations of the Lebègue Report (2005), the rate is 4% for maturities up to 30 years 
and 2% for subsequent years. This schedule is a compromise that approximates using the 
Ramsey rule with  = 1%,  = 2, and g = 1.5% for the first 30 years, and representing 
uncertainty about growth as a binary lottery in which g takes a common value for all future 
years, equal to 2% with probability 2/3 and 0.5% with probability 1/3.  
In Norway, current guidance specifies a risk-free discount rate of 2% to which a risk premium 
of 2% is added for normal projects, yielding a discount rate of 4%. For projects viewed as 
having a high degree of systematic risk, the risk adjustment should be increased to 4%, 
yielding a discount rate of 6%. For major projects, systematic uncertainty about the costs, 
benefits, and how these are resolved over time is supposed to be analyzed and used to adjust 
the risk-free rate of 2%; however this has proven difficult in practice. A recent expert 
committee charged with reviewing the guidance endorsed a rate of 4% for projects with 
maturities up to 40 years and recommended a schedule of declining rates: 3% for years 40-75 
and 2% thereafter (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2012). 
3. Positive	approach		
We have seen in Section 2.1 that the private sector should use the market interest rate as the 
rate at which risk-free cash flows should be discounted. In this section, we discuss whether 
this should be a universal recommendation.  
Consider a (marginal) action that yields a cost C today and a sure benefit B in t years. Is this 
project socially desirable? To answer this question, suppose the market interest rate 
corresponding to that maturity is r. Suppose also that the project is financed by a reallocation 
of safe capital to the project. Disinvestment of C units of capital today reduces the payoff of 
safe capital in the economy by C exp(rt) at time t. Reallocating safe capital to the project has 
no effect on current consumption and increases consumption at time t by B – C exp(rt). This 
action is socially desirable if and only if the increase in consumption is positive, i.e., if the 
NPV [–C + B exp(-rt)] is positive. This demonstrates that the efficient discount rate in this 
context is simply the interest rate. Under this argument, the discount rate can be interpreted as 
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the opportunity cost of safe capital. It is closely related to the arbitrage argument so classical 
in the finance literature: If the NPV of the project with r as the discount rate is positive, one 
can produce a safe positive profit by investing in the project and by going short on (i.e., 
borrowing at) the risk-free rate. This argument is ‘positive’ because it is based on the revealed 
preferences expressed via market interest rates.  
The same argument arises when economists explain why a zero discount rate cannot be 
socially desirable. Suppose the interest rate on financial markets is positive. If a project with 
zero rate of return is financed by disinvestment of productive safe capital, its payoff does not 
compensate for the lost return, thereby destroying value for future generations. Said 
differently, if current generations want to improve the future, they should invest in the 
productive capital in the economy (yielding a positive marginal return) rather than in the 
project.  
We believe that this positive argument provides a strong basis to discount safe projects whose 
maturities are within the range of maturities of safe assets actively traded on financial 
markets. While we have estimates of historical real returns to safe assets (see Table 1), future 
real returns are necessarily uncertain. Interest rates on most government bonds are nominal, 
and so the real return will depend on realized inflation over the period to maturity. The 
positive approach cannot be applied for time horizons exceeding 20 or 30 years, because there 
are no safe assets traded on markets with such large maturities. Sovereign bonds with such 
large maturities of even the most financially reliable countries cannot be considered 
completely safe because of both inflation and default risk.  
4. The	Ramsey	rule	and	the	normative	risk‐free‐rate	puzzle	
Suppose alternatively that the investment project considered in the previous section is 
financed through a reduction of consumption by the current generation, for the benefit of the 
future generation. In that case, there will be an (intergenerational) distributional effect. The 
evaluation of the project is more difficult than when one generation bears the net impact of 
the action as assumed in the previous section. In such a context, one needs to make ethical 
judgments about the intergenerational transfers. The standard approach inherited from public 
economics and public-choice theory is to evaluate the project in relation to its impact on the 
utilitarian intergenerational welfare function: 
 0( ) ( ),
t
tW u c e Eu c
   (1) 
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where 0c  and tc  are respectively current and future consumption, and u is the (common) 
utility function. The parameter  is the utility discount rate or rate of pure time preference; it 
is sometimes interpreted as the per-period probability of extinction. From Ramsey onward, 
many commentators have argued that ethics require  = 0, a position we accept here. A non-
zero value of  penalizes people on the basis of their birth date, which is as ethically 
unacceptable as racism (penalty based on the color of the skin) and sexism (penalty based on 
gender). Macroeconomists, classical growth theorists, and finance theorists have used a 
positive value as a technical trick to escape the problem of the potential unboundedness of 
intertemporal welfare in infinite-horizon models. While individuals may discount their own 
future utility, that is not a reason to penalize future generations in the welfare function. To 
quote Solow (1974), “in solemn conclave assembled, so to speak, we ought to act as if the 
social rate of pure time preference were zero.” 
Intergenerational welfare is assumed to be the discounted sum of the flow of generational 
utility. Because the future is uncertain, future utility is evaluated through the expected utility 
of future consumption. Under this approach, a reduction in current consumption can be 
socially desirable if its impact on current utility is more than compensated by an increase in 
future utility.  
If the project is marginal, its impact on W is positive if its current social cost 0'( )Cu c is 
smaller than its future social benefit '( )tBEu c . This inequality can be rewritten as:  
 
0
'( )0  with  .
'( )
t tR t R t tEu cC Be e
u c
      (2) 
We can interpret this condition as a standard NPV test with a discount rate tR  which 
incorporates both social preferences and beliefs about future growth. The efficient discount 
factor exp( )tR t  is simply the expected marginal rate of substitution between current and 
future consumption. 
It is assumed that the utility function u is increasing and concave. This implies that the 
marginal utility of consumption is decreasing. In other words, if a social planner has the 
opportunity to transfer consumption from one agent to another, it would be optimal to transfer 
from the richest to the poorest individual. Thus the concavity of u is a notion of aversion to 
inequalities. It is standard to consider the power specification 1( ) / (1 )u c c    , where 0   
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measures the degree of inequality aversion in the economy. In the limit case of inequality 
neutrality, 0   and 'u  is a constant, so that 0'( ) / '( )tEu c u c  equals unity. This means that the 
efficient discount rate tR  defined in (2) is equal to zero. We hereafter assume that   is 
positive to incorporate inequality aversion. 
Suppose first that there is no uncertainty surrounding the growth of the economy. Then, the 
definition of the efficient discount rate tR  in (2) implies the following characterization: 
 
0
1 with  ln .tt t t
cR g g
t c
   (3) 
This is called the Ramsey rule, after Frank Ramsey (1928) who was the first to derive this 
condition from an optimal dynamic consumption-saving problem.4 The socially efficient 
discount associated to maturity t equals the product of the degree of inequality aversion   and 
the average growth rate of consumption from today to date t, tg . In the special case with a 
constant consumption growth rate g ( 0 exp( )tc c gt ), the Ramsey rule yields a constant 
discount rate R g .  
The importance of the Ramsey rule to the debate on the discount rate should not be 
underestimated. It provides a crucial ethical argument in favor of discounting. In a growing 
economy, safely investing for the future is equivalent to transferring sure consumption from 
the current poor to the future wealthy. Under inequality aversion, this is socially desirable 
only if the return to the project is large enough to compensate for the increased 
intergenerational inequality it generates. The minimum rate of return is given by R g , 
which is positive and increasing in both the degree of inequality aversion and in the growth 
rate.  
Under this normative approach, calibration of the Ramsey rule requires information about 
both the degree of inequality aversion and the growth rate. As the future growth rate is 
uncertain, we need to use some estimate. In the parable of Lucas (1978), the production side 
of the economy is represented by trees in fixed supply (no capital accumulation) whose fruits 
are consumed by the representative agent, and the economic growth rate is exogenously given 
by the natural law of tree growth. In that case, g can be considered as exogenous to the 
                                                 
4 The Ramsey rule is often written as t tR g    to accommodate a non-zero value of   in equation (1). 
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economic process. In classical growth theory (Solow 1956), economic growth is jointly 
generated by the accumulation of capital and by innovation. In the short run, capital 
accumulation and the interest rate are jointly determined from dynamic-equilibrium 
conditions.  
Uncertainty about the future growth rate imposes an obvious limitation on what economists 
can say about the efficient discount rate for very long maturities. All we can say is that if we 
collectively agree that the average growth rate will be 2% per year through some time 
horizon, then it is coherent to use a discount rate of 2 %  for this time horizon. A growth rate 
of 2% is an interesting benchmark, because this has been the average growth rate of western 
countries over the last two centuries. 
The degree of inequality aversion   is an ethical parameter. The second column of Table 2 
documents some of the normative statements that various economists have made about its 
value. A degree of inequality aversion between 1 and 4 seems to be a consensual proposition, 
with 2   as focal reference. 
Table 2: Calibration of the discount rate based on the Ramsey equation (3). Note that 
some of the authors add a rate of impatience   to the Ramsey rule, so that the last 
column is only a partial representation of what these authors recommend for the discount 
rate. 
Author 
Inequality 
Aversion   
Growth 
rate 
g 
Discount 
 Rate 
g  
Stern (1977) 2   
Cline (1992) 1.5 1% 1.5% 
IPCC (1995) 1.5-2 1.6% - 8% 2.4% - 16% 
Arrow (1999) 2 2% 4% 
UK: Green Book (HM Treasury, 2003) 1 2% 2% 
France: Rapport Lebègue (2005) 2 2% 4% 
Stern (2007) 1 1.3% 1.3% 
Arrow (2007) 2-3   
Dasgupta (2007) 2-4   
Weitzman (2007a) 2 2% 4% 
Nordhaus (2008) 2 2% 4% 
Pindyck (2013) 1-3   
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It is important to understand the meaning of the degree of inequality aversion. To illustrate, 
consider an economy with two social classes of equal population, where the upper class 
consumes twice as much as the lower class. Consider a marginal redistributive policy to 
increase consumption in the lower class by $1. What is the maximum sacrifice by the upper 
class that is justified to provide this benefit to the poor? If the answer is $1, one is inequality 
neutral; a sacrifice of more than $1 reveals some degree of inequality aversion. The maximum 
sacrifice 2k  . Thus, a degree of inequality aversion of 2 means that one should be ready to 
give up as much as $4 of consumption of the wealthy to give $1 to the poor. The maximum 
sacrifice increases to $16 if 4  , as recommended by some (Table 2). Notice that the power 
specification for u implies that the problem is homothetic, so that absolute wealth does not 
matter for determining the social efficiency of marginal transfers. 
Disagreement about the level of   comes from the fact that this parameter plays many 
different roles in the discounted expected utility (DEU) model. For example, under the 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance, the level of inequality aversion should be equal to the degree of 
relative risk aversion of the representative consumer, thereby transforming an ethical 
parameter into a descriptive one. Quoting Ju and Miao (2012), “researchers in 
macroeconomics and finance generally believe that the risk aversion parameter is around 2”, 
but a degree of relative risk aversion between 1 and 4 is more representative of a soft 
consensus among economists. Parameter   also measures aversion to consumption 
fluctuations over time in the standard consumption-saving problem, i.e., 1/  is the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution of consumption. Using estimates of demand systems, Stern 
(1977) found a concentration of estimates of   around 2 with a range of roughly 0–10. 
Epstein and Zin (1991), who proposed a generalization of the DEU to disentangle aversion to 
risk and to fluctuations, found a value ranging from 1.25 to 5. Pearce and Ulph (1995) 
estimated a range from 0.7 to 1.5.  
If we combine an index of inequality aversion of 2   with a prospective average growth rate 
of 2%g  , the Ramsey equation (3) gives us a normative discount rate of 4%. Table 2 gives 
some variations in the calibration of this equation that are representative of the current 
literature on this question. 
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The Ramsey rule tells us the minimum return required to induce a marginal increase in 
savings. The above analysis suggests that if one believes that the growth rate of the economy 
will remain close to its historical trend since the industrial revolution, one should not invest at 
the margin in safe projects whose return is less than 4%. But we have seen that past 
generations in the 20th century invested in safe projects whose return was as low as 1% in the 
United States. This led to a formidable accumulation of capital over the last century. This was 
socially undesirable. If past generations believed in a bright future, why did they sacrifice so 
much of their production for the benefit of their much wealthier successors? The low return 
on safe assets during the period did not compensate for the large intergenerational inequalities 
that this generous saving and investment behavior generated. We refer to this observation as 
the normative risk-free-rate puzzle.5 Two possible explanations are that past generations were 
pessimistic, or they recognized that economic growth is an uncertain process (see next 
section).  
To this point, our survey leads to two contradictory recommendations for the discount rate: 
use a positive market interest rate or a normative rate based on the Ramsey rule.6 This 
contradiction can be resolved by recalling how these two recommendations have been 
obtained. Under the positive approach, we assumed that the new risk-free project was 
financed through a reallocation of risk-free capital, so the opportunity cost of capital 
determines the discount rate. Under the normative approach, we alternatively assumed that the 
new project was financed by an increase of savings from the current generation, so the 
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution determines the discount rate.  
5.	Long‐term	discount‐rate	controversy		
The emergence of global challenges to the long-term sustainability of economic growth has 
forced economists to reevaluate the power of their arguments and models concerning the 
efficient discount rate. We have seen in Section 3 that the positive approach based on the 
opportunity cost of capital does not yield an immediate answer for the discount rate to be used 
for long horizons for which there is no actively traded safe asset. In Section 4, we have seen 
                                                 
5 Weil (1989) was the first to present the (positive) risk-free-rate puzzle, which states that the classical 
consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) cannot explain why interest rates have been so low 
during the last century. 
6 As implied by the normative risk-free-rate puzzle, our estimated normative rate (about 4%) exceeds the 
estimated positive rate (1 – 2%) for risk free projects. 
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that the normative approach relies on the prospective long-term growth rate of the economy, 
which is by nature highly uncertain. Thus, the two approaches raise specific questions when 
one wants to apply them to evaluate safe investment projects and public policies that have 
long-lasting impacts on the economy. Over the last 15 years, various arguments have been 
raised to justify using smaller rates to discount very distant costs and benefits. This 
controversial recommendation could bias our actions in favor of projects with distant benefits 
at the cost of reducing our efforts to improve the more immediate future. We reexamine these 
arguments here.7  
5.1. 	The	extended 	Ramsey	rule	
There is a simple argument in favor of a decreasing term structure of the safe discount rate, 
which is immediate from the Ramsey equation (3). Observe that the argument leading to this 
equation can be applied for any time horizon t. This means that the equation does not describe 
“the” discount rate, but rather the entire term structure of discount rates. To illustrate, consider 
a decelerating economy, i.e., an economy in which the average growth rate tg  decreases with 
the time horizon t. In that case, equation (3) tells us that the term structure of discount rates 
tR  will inherit a negative slope from the term structure of tg . Growth may be anticipated to 
decelerate for various reasons; Gordon (2012) provides an interesting overview. Deceleration 
is also typical of an economy entering the over-heating phase of its business cycle. But since 
2007, the western world is rather in the opposite situation, expecting acceleration after a 
recession. In such a context, one should use an increasing term structure of safe discount 
rates. This would have the advantage of biasing our collective actions toward those yielding 
immediate relief to citizens who are currently suffering because of the recession.  
An obvious critique of the Ramsey rule is that the prospective growth rate of consumption is 
uncertain. This uncertainty is at the heart of our collective decision problems related to 
sustainable development. For example, we have to decide whether to fight climate change 
long before knowing whether our descendants who will benefit will live in a new Stone Age 
or the Nirvana of an economy with a world GDP orders of magnitude larger than its current 
level. This uncertainty is an intrinsic ingredient of the problem that the Ramsey rule 
overlooks.  
                                                 
7 Arrow et al. (2013a,b) provide an alternative discussion of this controversial issue. 
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It is intuitive that uncertainty surrounding the future should induce society to take more care 
of it, i.e., to reduce the discount rate. At the micro level, this intuition is founded on the 
concepts of precautionary saving and prudence. Keynes (1930) was the first to suggest that 
individuals want to save more when their future income is more uncertain, and Drèze and 
Modiliani (1979), Leland (1968), and Kimball (1990) showed that this is indeed optimal if the 
marginal utility u' is convex. Under the standard specification with '( )u c c  , marginal 
utility is convex and so uncertainty about future consumption should indeed reduce the 
efficient discount rate. The intensity of this precautionary motive should be increasing in the 
degree of convexity of u', which is measured by the index of relative prudence –cu'''/u", 
which equals 1   in this power specification. 
Introducing uncertainty in the Ramsey model adds a degree of flexibility in the calibration of 
equation (2). The simplest and most classical specification assumes that tc  is lognormally 
distributed, with   20ln / ( , )t t tc c N    so that the expected average growth rate is equal to 
   1 20ln / 0.5 / .t t t tEg t Ec c t    8 Under this specification, equation (2) can be rewritten 
as follows: 
 0
0
(ln / )1 ln 0.5( 1) .t tt t
c Var c cR E Eg
t c t

 
            
 (4) 
This extension of the Ramsey formula to an uncertain future (obtained by Gollier 2002) is 
intuitive. It tells us that the Ramsey rule should be adapted to an uncertain future by reducing 
the expected growth rate by half the product of the degree of prudence 1   and the 
annualized variance 2 /t t of log consumption. Hansen and Singleton (1983) examined the 
special case in which the growth of log consumption follows a Brownian motion with trend 
 and volatility  . In that case, the expected average growth and the annualized variance of 
log consumption are both independent of the maturity and are respectively equal to 
20.5tEg g      and 20(ln / ) /tVar c c t  , so that equation (4) can be rewritten as: 
    2 20.5( 1) 0.5tR g          . (5) 
                                                 
8 We use several times the following property, which is ubiquitous in the modern theory of finance: 
2( , )x N    implies that 2exp( ) exp( ( 0.5 ))E ax a a   . 
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In this special case, the impact of uncertainty is to uniformly reduce the discount rate at all 
maturities by the same constant 20.5 ( 1)   . This is a rather disappointing result, for two 
reasons. First, this model cannot justify using a smaller discount rate for longer maturities, 
thus weighing against the controversial recommendation to use a decreasing term structure of 
discount rates. Second, the effect of uncertainty on the efficient discount rate is small. In the 
western world, the volatility  of the growth rate of consumption per capita has been around 
3% per year during the last century. With 2  , this means that the prudence effect reduces 
the efficient discount rate by only 20.5 2 3 (0.03) 0.27%    . The uncertainty affecting 
growth reduces the discount rate from 4% to 3.73%. This cannot solve the normative risk-
free-rate puzzle described in the previous section. 
Barro (2006, 2009) claimed that using the observed volatility of U.S. economic growth over 
the last century is not the right way to represent the uncertainty that we face in the future. This 
method fails to recognize the possibility of low-probability macro catastrophes of the order of 
magnitude that other countries experienced during the 20th century. Germany, Japan and 
France for example lost around 60% of their GDP during WWII. Monetary crises may also 
have dramatic effects such as the 21% loss of GDP in Argentina between 1998 and 2002. 
Recognizing that the U.S. is not immune to this type of event reduces the expected growth 
rate and increases the uncertainty, so it reduces the efficient discount rates. Recognition of the 
plausibility of catastrophes could reconcile the positive and normative approaches to 
discounting. 
5.2. 	Parameter	uncertainty	and	the	dismal	theorem	
An alternative road to reconciliation is examined by Gollier (2008, 2012). The result that the 
term structure of efficient discount rates is flat relies on the assumption that there is no 
persistence in the growth process. The specification leading to equation (5) includes the 
assumption that the change in consumption in the year 2101 is unrelated to the situation 
prevailing in 2100. We believe this is an unrealistic representation of our collective beliefs 
about long-term-growth process. The growth process is likely to be sensitive to random 
shocks with persistent effects, such as non-marginal innovations, geopolitical instabilities, or 
exhaustion and deterioration of natural assets. The history of civilizations provides numerous 
examples of persistent waves of growth and decline of human societies. The Brownian motion 
that is behind result (5) is unable to describe such systemic uncertainty.  
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The persistence of shocks to economic growth generates a positive correlation in the time 
series of the growth process   1 0,1,...ln / .t t t tx c c   It has no effect on the short-term 
uncertainty measured by the variance of 0x , but magnifies the uncertainty affecting far distant 
consumption levels measured by the variance of  0 0 1 1ln / ... .t tc c x x x      From equation 
(4), persistence of shocks has no effect on the efficient short-term discount rate, but it reduces 
the discount rate to be used for long maturities. This result provides a strong argument in 
favor of using a decreasing term structure of risk-free discount rates. Gollier (2008, 2012) 
provides various illustrations of this result by considering growth processes entailing mean-
reversion, two-regime Markov switches, or parametric uncertainty.  
Weitzman (2007) was the first to note that even if we assume that the economy evolves as a 
Brownian motion, one should recognize that there is a high degree of uncertainty about the 
long-term trend and volatility. Let us examine the case of an uncertain trend, which is a clear 
example of a positive statistical relationship between tx  and 'tx : if the trend happens to be 
high, it will raise the mean of all future growth rates. This will make the term structure of 
discount rates decreasing. The simplest case is when our beliefs about the trend are 
characterized by a normal distribution. Gollier (2008) shows that this implies a linearly 
decreasing term structure, which implies that the efficient discount rate goes to minus infinity 
for super-long maturities. Informally, this means that if we have a feasible option today to 
transfer a sure infinitesimal unit of consumption to the very distant future, we should do so at 
any cost. The intuition is that the impossibility of excluding a very negative growth trend 
yields such a terrible risk for distant generations that one should do everything possible to 
escape the risk that they will face zero consumption. (In the standard model, marginal utility 
goes to infinity when consumption goes to zero.)  
One can eliminate this paradox if the set of plausible growth trends is bounded below. What 
should be the optimal short/long spread of the safe discount rates in that case? Gollier (2008, 
2013) shows the asymptotic value of the discount rate for maturities tending to infinity is 
equal to the one coming from equation (5) where   is replaced by its smallest plausible 
value. In Figure 1, we illustrate this theory by examining an economy with an index of 
inequality aversion 2  , a volatility 3%  , and a mean growth of log consumption which 
is unknown, but with a mean of 0 2%  . When the trend   is 2% for sure, the efficient 
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discount rate is 3.82%tR   for all maturities. In contrast, if the trend is either 0% or 4% with 
equal probabilities, this parameter uncertainty does not affect the rate at which short term 
payoffs must be discounted but it reduces the efficient discount rate for super-long maturities 
to 0.18%R   . 
 
Figure 1: Term structure of efficient discount rates, assuming 2  , 3%  and the trend of 
growth is [ , ]a b , which means that it is either a or b with equal probabilities. 
Weitzman (2007b) considers a model where the trend of the economy is known, but its 
volatility is not. He argues that it is natural to represent our collective beliefs about this 
volatility by an inverse gamma distribution and shows that the efficient safe discount rate then 
goes to minus infinity for all maturities. Weitzman (2009) generalized this result in a 
controversial ‘dismal theorem’. It states that, under this fundamental uncertainty about the 
volatility of economic growth, we should do everything we can to transfer infinitesimally 
small sure amounts of consumption to each future generation. This result comes again from 
the assumption of an unbounded marginal utility at zero and the existence of a fat left tail in 
the distribution of future consumption.9 Horowitz and Lange (2009), Karp (2009), Nordhaus 
(2011) and Millner (2013) criticized the dismal theorem on various bases, including that 
marginal utility is likely to be bounded and the unbounded support of plausible volatility is 
unrealistic. 
                                                 
9 In this case, log consumption has a Student-t distribution rather than a normal distribution. 
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5.3. 	The	Weitzman‐Gollier	controversy	
Weitzman visited the University of Toulouse in 1996. On this occasion, Gollier presented an 
initial argument for a decreasing term structure that was based on the extended Ramsey rule 
(4) combined with the assumption of an index of inequality aversion ''( ) / '( )cu c u c that is 
decreasing rather than constant (Gollier 2002). Weitzman reacted by providing a much 
simpler argument. This led to the publication of two controversial papers by Weitzman (1998, 
2001). At first sight, this argument looks quite distant from the theory presented above. The 
argument goes as follows. Let us reconsider a risk-free project with immediate cost C and 
future benefit B occurring in t years. Its NPV equals exp( )tC B R t   . Suppose now that the 
discount rate is uncertain, i.e., that tR  is a random variable. In that case, it is not clear which 
decision criterion should be applied. Weitzman (1998, 2001) assumes that the project should 
be implemented if and only if the expected NPV is positive. This is equivalent to applying the 
standard NPV rule with a certainty equivalent discount rate WtR that takes the following form: 
 1ln .tR tWtR Eet
   (6) 
Assuming that the random variable tR is independent of t, Weitzman shows that the certainty 
equivalent rate WtR  decreases from the expected rate tER to its smallest plausible value when 
the maturity goes from zero to infinity.  
Various interpretations of this model have been proposed. Weitzman (2001) posited that 
individuals use heterogeneous tR . It is not clear in that paper whether this heterogeneity 
comes from differences in preferences or beliefs about future growth. If the problem is to 
aggregate heterogeneous beliefs, it would be important to know whether this heterogeneity 
comes from asymmetric information, or whether people agree to disagree on their 
fundamental beliefs about the future of civilization.10 If the problem is to aggregate 
heterogeneous preferences, a better aggregate rule could be to use the preferences of the 
median voter (see Weitzman 2013). Weitzman (2001) also assumes that the sample of 2160 
values of tR  coming from a questionnaire sent indiscriminately to academic economists 
                                                 
10 Freeman and Groom (2010) reexamine various interpretations and calibrations of the argument in Weitzman 
(2001). 
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provides a valid estimate of the collective uncertainty we face about the ‘true’ discount rate to 
calibrate the certainty equivalent equation.  
In Weitzman (1998), a positive approach is considered, so that tR  is interpreted as the market 
long interest rate, or as the average opportunity cost of capital that will prevail over the period 
[0,t]. Newell and Pizer (2003, 2004) and Groom, Koundouri, Panopoulou and Pantelidis, 
(2007) have calibrated this model by using long time series of interest rates in different 
countries. This positive interpretation is also problematic. It ignores an old debate in finance 
theory about how long forward interest rates should be determined when future short interest 
rates are uncertain. If one interprets tR in equation (6) as the future short term rate, which is 
assumed to be constant through time but unknown today, then this equation is nothing other 
than the Expectations Hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates that exists in the 
literature since at least Macaulay (1938). This hypothesis has been highly controversial. To 
quote Froot (1989), “if the attractiveness of an economic hypothesis is measured by the 
number of papers which statistically reject it, the expectations theory of the term structure is a 
knockout.” Surely one reason for the empirical failure of this hypothesis is that it assumes 
investors are risk neutral: when comparing the strategy to purchase a long bond to one of 
rolling over investments in short term bonds yielding a reinvestment risk, investors just 
compare the expected final return. 
In line with earlier work by Pazner and Razin (1975), Gollier (2004) provides another critique 
which led to the so-called Weitzman-Gollier puzzle. Under certainty, the NPV rule is exactly 
equivalent to the Net Future Value (NFV) rule which states that one should invest in the 
project if and only if its NFV tR tCe B   is positive. Obviously, the NFV and the NPV have 
the same sign, so they lead to the same final decision. The logic of the NPV is to transfer the 
future benefit B to the present; the logic of the NFV is to transfer the current cost C  to the 
future. Although the two rules are equivalent if the interest rate tR  is certain, they are not if 
tR  is uncertain. The criterion to invest if and only if the expected NFV of the project is 
positive is equivalent to the standard NPV approach with a discount rate GtR  defined as 
follows: 
 1ln .tR tGtR Eet
  (7) 
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It is easy to show that these alternative certainty equivalent discount rates have a term 
structure that is increasing, going from tER up to the largest plausible tR  for maturities going 
from zero to infinity. So, we have a puzzle, because there is no a priori reason to prefer one 
approach over the other. As Gollier (2004) explained, his aim was not to suggest that one 
should use the NFV approach to long-term discounting but to demonstrate that Weitzman 
(1998, 2001) failed to provide a convincing economic argument.  
This controversy led to an active debate. Hepburn and Groom (2007) generalized the expected 
NPV/NFV analysis described above by showing that one can consider evaluation dates other 
than 0 (for NPV) or t (for NFV), each choice yielding a different term structure. Buchholz and 
Schumacher (2008) introduced risk aversion to the analysis and defined the certainty-
equivalent discount rate accordingly, but their recommendation remains sensitive to the date 
at which costs and benefits are borne.  
In a series of papers (Gollier 2009, 2010), Weitzman (2010), Gollier and Weitzman 2010), 
Gollier and Weitzman converged to the conclusion that both risk aversion and the 
optimization of the allocation of the net benefits through time must be introduced into the 
picture to solve the puzzle. Suppose that the representative agent must decide whether to 
invest in the safe project at some date t = -1, immediately before learning what interest rate 
tR  will prevail during the investment period [0,t]. Ex post (at t = 0), the agent will optimally 
determine her consumption-saving plan, so that the state-dependent optimality condition 
0exp( ) '( ) / '( )t tR t u c u c  will prevail. Notice that this implies that consumption growth rates 
are characterized by extreme persistence. In fact, under the specification of Weitzman (1998, 
2001) and of all the papers that contributed to the controversy, the shock to consumption 
growth is permanent! If the agent contemplates consuming the net benefit at date 0, it is 
optimal to invest ex ante if   0exp( ) '( )tA E C B R t u c    is positive. Alternatively, if the 
agent contemplates consuming the net benefit at the termination date t, it is optimal to invest 
ex ante if  exp( ) '( )t tB E C R t B u c   is positive. But it is immediate from the optimality 
condition that the two conditions are exactly the same: A B . This observation solves the 
puzzle. In the special case with a logarithmic utility function, it is well-known that the optimal 
saving is independent of the interest rate. In this special case 0c  is thus certain. In that case, 
condition 0A   corresponds exactly to the Weitzman expected NPV rule, as shown by 
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Gollier (2009). More generally, Gollier (2009) showed that the term structure of discount 
rates is decreasing and that the extended Ramsey rule (4) is compatible with this approach. 
Traeger (2013) provides the same conclusion, together with other insights.11 
We conclude that the recommendation of a decreasing term structure initially made by 
Weitzman (1998) was correct, but for a different reason. His result is determined by the 
unrealistic assumption that shocks on the return to capital are permanent, and hence so are the 
induced shocks on consumption growth. If Weitzman would have assumed purely transitory 
shocks on the return of capital, then shocks on consumption growth would have been serially 
uncorrelated. In that case, we know from Section 5 that the term structure of the efficient 
discount rate would be perfectly flat.  
Our conclusion on this controversy is twofold. First, as shown in Section 5, what matters for 
determining whether smaller rates should be used for longer maturities is the existence of a 
positive statistical relation in the time series of growth rates of consumption. This provides a 
solid economic foundation and intuition for Weitzman’s (1998) policy recommendation. 
Second, because of the absence of realism in Weitzman’s assumption about the permanency 
of shocks on interest rates, it is not appropriate to use his famous rule (6) to recommend a 
specific term structure, as did the U.K. government for example (HM Treasury 2003). Instead, 
we must go through the hard work of describing the stochastic process of the long-term 
growth process, potentially with parametric uncertainty.  
6.	Relative	prices	
Up to this point, we have treated consumption at date t as a single good ct and well-being as a 
function of consumption u(ct). In fact, people consume a diversity of goods and services and 
the composition of consumption changes over time. Especially over long periods, the basket 
of goods that are consumed can shift dramatically; for example, most of the goods currently 
used for transportation, communication, and computation did not exist 100 years ago.  
In addition to market goods, well-being depends on non-market goods such as health and 
ecosystem services. These are not included in conventional economic measures, but are 
                                                 
11 Freeman (2010) examined a similar model, but with Epstein-Zin preferences. He obtained qualitatively similar 
conclusions by assuming risk neutrality but aversion to consumption fluctuations. 
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critical to well-being. Valuing the contribution of ecosystem services to well-being is 
notoriously difficult (Bockstael et al. 2000, Costanza et al. 1997, Kling et al. 2012) but the 
contribution of health improvements is more amenable to quantification. Estimates suggest 
the value of improvements in life expectancy (setting aside improvements in health quality) 
over the 20th century is comparable to the value of increased consumption of market goods 
over that period (Nordhaus 2003, Murphy and Topel 2006). 
Relative prices of market and non-market goods can change dramatically. The prices of novel 
popular goods fall from infinite before they are introduced to affordable. Even for ancient 
goods and services, technological innovation can produce huge price changes. For example, 
Nordhaus (1997) estimates that the price of domestic lighting relative to a conventional 
consumer price index decreased by a factor of more than 1,000 over the period 1800 – 1992. 
When real prices change, the effective discount rate varies by good. If the relative price of a 
good increases at a rate d compared with the numeraire, which is discounted at rate r, then the 
effective rate of discount on the good is r – d. In the context of environmental quality, this 
effective rate is described as the ‘ecological discount rate’ (Guesnerie 2004, Hoel and Sterner 
2007, Gollier 2010, 2012). It measures the rate of substitution between the good at different 
dates. In health economics, the long-standing debate about whether future health and costs 
should be discounted at the same rate in cost-effectiveness analysis is essentially a question of 
whether the relative value of health and the goods that comprise the cost term is constant 
(Gravelle and Smith 2001, Hammitt 2012). 
The relative values of ecosystem services and of health seem likely to rise relative to those of 
material goods, as production and consumption of material goods increase. It is well 
established that the value of mortality risk increases with real income and so risk reductions 
(‘statistical lives saved’) are effectively discounted at a lower rate than other benefits. In its 
evaluation of the rules limiting use of stratospheric-ozone-depleting substances, EPA included 
reductions in skin-cancer mortality risk to cohorts of U.S. citizens ranging up to those born in 
2075. In its base case, EPA assumed that the value of skin-cancer mortality risk would grow 
at the same rate as real income (assumed to be 1.7%); discounting the monetary value at the 
base-case discount rate of 2% yields an effective discount rate for mortality risk of 0.3%. In 
an alternative case, EPA assumed the value of mortality risk would grow at twice the rate of 
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income growth (3.4%) and discounted benefits at only 1%, yielding an effective discount rate 
of -2.4% (Hammitt 1997). 
There are two equivalent methods for valuing future goods when relative prices may change. 
The standard approach is to estimate the monetary value of the increment to the good at the 
future date, then discount this value at the same rate as for all other monetary values. The 
alternative approach, suggested by Malinvaud (1953), is to estimate the present increment to 
the good that produces the same welfare effect as the specified future increment using the 
ecological discount rate (for that good) and value the present increment using its current 
monetary value. 
Let us generalize equation (1) to a case in which utility u(c1t, c2t) depends on two goods, an 
aggregate consumption good c1t and another good or service such as health or environmental 
quality c2t, (for concreteness we refer to c2 as environment). We obtain 
10 20 1 2( , ) ( , ),t tW u c c Eu c c       (8) 
where the expectation reflects uncertainty about the future values c1t and c2t (and 0  ). 
Consider a marginal project that would reduce current consumption c10 by  exp(-r1tt) and 
increase consumption by a sure amount  at date t, with no effect on the environment. The 
‘economic discount rate’ is defined as the rate r1 such that this project has no effect on W; it is 
given by  
 
 1 1 21 1 10 20
,1 ln ,
,
t t
t
EU c c
r
t U c c
       (9) 
where U1(c1t, c2t) is the derivative of U with respect to its first argument. In contrast to the 
case with only one good (equation (3)), the economic discount rate depends on the evolution 
of the environment between dates 0 and t (unless the marginal utility of consumption is 
independent of environment, U12 = 0). 
Now consider a marginal environmental project that will increase c2t by a sure amount . The 
standard method to value this improvement is to calculate the monetary value at t by 
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multiplying  by the future marginal rate of substitution between consumption and the 
environment, 
 
 2 1 212 1 1 2
,
.
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t tt
t
t t tU
U c cdcv
dc U c c
        (10) 
The resulting monetary value at date t is then discounted to the present using the economic 
discount rate r1t. A complication is that, seen from date 0, the future rate of substitution 
between consumption and the environment is uncertain.  
The alternative approach is to calculate the ecological discount rate. Consider a marginal 
project that increases c2t by a sure amount  and reduces c20 by  exp(-r2tt). This project will 
have no effect on welfare if r2t is the ecological discount rate over the period,  
 
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       (11) 
The monetary value of this environmental increment is obtained by multiplying by the current 
rate of substitution between consumption and environment v0 (equation (10)). 
Both the economic and ecological discount rates depend on the growth in consumption and in 
environment over the period, and on uncertainty about these growth rates. Let us examine the 
determinants of the ecological discount rate. 
If U is concave in c2, then the ecological discount rate is larger if the environment will 
improve (and smaller if it will worsen) over the period 0 to t, because of diminishing marginal 
utility. This effect is analogous to the effect of economic growth on the discount rate in the 
single-good case.  
The effect of uncertainty about the change in c2 depends on the curvature of U2. If U2 is 
convex (U22 > 0), then uncertainty about the change in c2 decreases the ecological discount 
rate. This effect is analogous to the precautionary effect in the extended Ramsey rule 
(equation (4)), i.e., one should do more to protect the future environment if its state is more 
uncertain. 
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The effect of growth in consumption c1 on the ecological discount rate depends on whether 
consumption and environment are complements or substitutes. When c2 represents 
environment, both possibilities seem plausible: stronger technological growth suggests less 
reliance on environment for production but its value for other uses (or non-use value) may 
increase. If consumption and environment are substitutes (U12 < 0), stronger consumption 
growth decreases U2 and hence increases the ecological discount rate. When c2 represents 
health, a complementary relationship seems most plausible (U12 > 0; Hammitt 2013). In this 
case, stronger consumption growth increases the marginal utility of health and decreases the 
health discount rate. 
The effect of uncertainty about consumption growth on the ecological discount rate depends 
on the sign of U211. If this derivative is positive, U2 is convex in c1t and so adding a zero-mean 
risk to c1t increases EU2(c1t, c2t). The condition that U211 > 0 is called ‘cross-prudence in 
consumption’. It can be interpreted as the case where harms to consumption and environment 
are ‘mutually aggravating’ in the following sense (Eeckhoudt et al. 2007): Consider an 
arbitrary pair (c1t, c2t), a sure loss to environment –l and a zero-mean risk to consumption . 
Lottery A is a fifty-fifty chance to face the consumption risk or the sure environmental loss; 
lottery B is a fifty-fifty chance to face the consumption risk and the environmental loss 
simultaneously or to face neither. Cross-prudence in consumption implies a preference for A 
over B, i.e., to face one harm for sure rather than risk facing them together.  
Finally, the ecological discount rate also depends on the dependence between c1t and c2t. If 
consumption and environment are positively dependent and U is ‘cross-prudent in 
environment’ (U221 > 0), then a positive dependence of growth in consumption and 
environment increases EU2(c1t, c2t) and hence decreases the ecological discount rate. Cross-
prudence in environment implies that an environmental risk and a consumption loss are 
mutually aggravating, and hence one prefers a lottery with a fifty-fifty chance to face one or 
the other to a lottery with equal chances of facing both harms simultaneously or neither. 
A parallel analysis shows that the economic discount rate r1t also depends on the same factors: 
the changes in environmental quality and in consumption, uncertainty about the changes, and 
the dependence between them. 
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7.	Risky	projects	
The arguments developed above are about the level and term structure of the risk-free 
discount rate, i.e., of the rate at which safe projects should be discounted. Most of these 
arguments have been developed in the context of climate change. They have also served in 
public reports in the U.K. (HM Treasury 2003), the U.S. (Office of Management and Budget 
2003), and France (Lebègue 2005) to justify a unique all-purpose rate schedule to discount the 
expected net benefits of public policies. But most investment projects have uncertain future 
benefits and costs, particularly those involving the distant future.  
There are at least three classical theories that provide recommendations about how to treat the 
riskiness of future costs and benefits in the evaluation of projects and policies. The most basic 
is based on the so-called Arrow-Lind Theorem (Arrow and Lind 1970). This theorem states 
that when an investment project yields net benefits that are independent of the systematic risk 
of the economy, these benefits should be discounted at the risk-free rate. The intuition is that 
risk can be spread among a large population of stakeholders. Because the risk premium goes 
to zero as the square of the size of risk in the EU framework, this dissemination virtually 
eliminates the risk. Although Arrow and Lind recognize in their paper that their result holds in 
theory only for idiosyncratic risks, they intend to apply it to a much broader domain. They 
claim “the government undertakes a wide range of public investments and it appears 
reasonable to assume that their returns are independent.” This is a logical mistake because the 
net benefits of most public projects are affected by some common factors, such as global 
economic activity. The fallacious interpretation of the Arrow-Lind Theorem overlooks the 
cost of risk in public projects. This is a problem because the valuation of projects in the 
private sector puts a high premium on risky projects, as can be seen by the large difference in 
the cost of safe and risky capital (Table 1). By reducing the discount rate to evaluate risky 
projects in the public sphere, this fallacy has contributed to the expansion of the public sector 
in many western countries over the last four decades. In the U.S., this problem may help to 
explain why a large discount rate of 7% has been selected and maintained since 1992 (revised 
downward from 10% in the 1980s).  
An alternative method to treat the riskiness of future benefits is clearly stated in the second 
report of the IPCC (1995): “Most economists believe that considerations of risk can be treated 
by converting outcomes into certainty equivalents, amounts that reflect the degree of risk in 
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an investment, and discounting these certainty equivalents.” By converting uncertain benefits 
into certainty-equivalent benefits, the evaluator puts himself back into the framework 
examined in this paper, so risk-free discount rates can be used. The difficulty comes of course 
from the specification of the certainty-equivalent operator. Let us consider an agent who will 
consume tc  at date t and who contemplates a marginal outcome tB  occurring at that time. In 
the EU model, this marginal outcome has an effect on welfare that is equivalent to receiving 
the sure amount  '( ) / '( )t t t tP E B u c Eu c  at date t. Thus, tP  is the certainty-equivalent 
benefit which should be discounted at the risk-free rate tR  described above. Observe that 
when tc  and tB  are independent, we immediately obtain that the certainty equivalent of tB  is 
just the expectation of tB . This is the Arrow-Lind Theorem. Suppose alternatively that the 
future benefit tB  is linked to future consumption through the following statistical relation: 
t t tB c
 , where   is a scalar and t  is a noise independent of tc , with 1tE  . Observe that 
  is a measure of the degree of correlation between the benefit of the project and economic 
growth. If we assume, as in the benchmark model that generated the extended Ramsey rule (5)
, that relative inequality aversion is constant and that log consumption follows a Brownian 
motion with drift   and volatility  , then the certainty-equivalent outcome at date t can be 
rewritten as follows: 
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 (8) 
The certainty-equivalent outcome is proportional to the expected outcome, and the factor of 
proportionality is exponentially decreasing at rate  , where 2   is called the systematic 
risk premium. 
This observation provides a nice introduction to the third method to integrate the risky payoffs 
into the evaluation. Under the standard specification presented above, we know that the risk-
free discount rate tR  is equal to the constant 
2 20.5R     . Thus, the outcome occurring 
at date t has a present value exp( )tP Rt , which is equivalent to exp ( )tEB R t  . This 
means that the expected value of the uncertain outcome tB  is discounted at the constant rate 
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.R    Thus, the third method consists of discounting the flow of expected payoffs at a 
rate   that is adjusted for risk by adding a risk premium   to the risk-free rate R . This is 
the classical result of the consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM; Rubinstein 
(1976), Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979)). These risk-adjusted discount rates are commonly 
applied in the private sector. The evaluation of investment projects is based on their CCAPM-
betas, which are typically OLS estimates of the equation ln lnt t tB c      .  
Although the certainty-equivalent method is theoretically equivalent to it, it is the CCAPM 
method that has emerged as the common language and practice of economists over the last 
four decades. It must be noticed that the CCAPM has mostly failed to explain how financial 
markets value risk. For example, the equity-premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985) 
shows that the CCAPM predicts a systematic risk premium of 22 (3%) 0.18%     under 
the assumption of 2   and 3%  , which is an order of magnitude smaller than the 
observed risk premium of assets with 1  . On a more normative ground, considering such a 
small systematic risk premium looks very counterintuitive, since it makes the riskiness of 
projects nearly irrelevant to their evaluation. One possible resolution of the puzzle is offered 
by Barro’s (2006, 2009) observation that calibrating a pricing formula on a volatility of 
consumption growth estimated from past data overlooks the possibility of large macro 
catastrophes. He shows that introducing low-probability catastrophes into the model can raise 
the systematic risk premium to 3%-5% per year.12  
What can be said about the term structure of the risk-adjusted discount rate  ? We have 
shown above that this term structure is flat under the standard assumption of a random walk 
for the economic growth rate. The persistence of shocks to the consumption growth rate 
changes this, by magnifying the long-term risk, which magnifies the long-term precautionary 
effect, and so reduces the long-term risk-free discount rate. But persistence has the opposite 
effect on the term structure of the systematic risk premium, as shown by Gollier (2013). By 
magnifying the risk on distant consumption, it magnifies the risk on the distant payoff of all 
                                                 
12 In his report to the French government, Gollier (2011) used this argument to recommend a systematic risk 
premium around 3%  . Implementation of this new evaluation rule has been controversial in France because 
it tends to raise the public discount rate. Industries with risky projects to be publicly financed are currently 
lobbying to use the certainty-equivalent approach. This is interesting because, as explained in the text, the 
certainty-equivalent approach calibrated on historical data is equivalent to using a systematic risk premium that 
is an order of magnitude smaller than the official 3%. In short, lobbies want to go back to the old fallacious 
Arrow-Lind framework. 
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projects with a positive beta. By risk aversion, this magnifies the risk premium for long 
maturities. The larger the beta of the project, the stronger is this countervailing effect. If the 
beta of the project is large enough, the net effect on the slope of the term structure of the risk-
adjusted discount rate is positive.  
The risk adjustment of discount rates is not common practice in public sectors, France and 
Norway being the only exceptions of which we are aware. The reason for this inefficiency is 
likely to come from the difficulty to estimate betas. Let us illustrate this point with climate 
change. What is the beta of projects whose main objective is to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases? Some authors have suggested that the ‘climate beta’ is negative, i.e., that 
the future benefits of fighting climate change are largest in states where future consumption 
will be smallest. Sandsmark and Vennemo (2007), Weitzman (2012), and Murphy and Topel 
(2013) developed the idea that if the main source of long term uncertainty is the climate 
sensitivity, then a high climate sensitivity will at the same time reduce consumption and raise 
the benefit of reducing emissions. Under that story, the climate beta is negative and reducing 
emissions has an insurance benefit that should be incorporated into a discount rate that is 
smaller than the risk-free rate. In contrast, Nordhaus (2011), who used Monte-Carlo 
simulation of the RICE model, reached the conclusion of a positive climate beta: “Those 
states in which the global temperature increase is particularly high are also ones in which we 
are on average richer in the future.” This is easy to understand: if the main source of long-
term uncertainty is economic growth, then a large growth rate yields at the same time large 
consumption and large concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, yielding a large marginal 
climate damage. Gollier (2013) suggested that the relative uncertainty affecting long-term 
economic growth is much larger than the uncertainty affecting climate sensitivity, which 
implies that the net effect is a climate beta that is positive and larger than unity. He concluded 
that the term structure of the climate discount rates is increasing, from 3.5% for short 
maturities up to 4.5% for long ones. But this is clearly very exploratory and controversial.  
8.	Conclusion	
The discount rate is a measure of the relative importance of consequences occurring at 
different points in time. The estimated net benefits of projects whose benefits and costs are 
widely separated in time, such as climate mitigation, are highly sensitive to this rate. And yet 
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there is no consensus on the correct discount rate to use for evaluating public projects, nor is 
there a single discount rate.  
As we have discussed, the appropriate discount rate is likely to vary with the maturity, and so 
it is more useful to think of a schedule of discount rates for different maturities. The discount 
rate for a project with a specified maturity depends on the uncertainty about the state of the 
world in which the future benefits will occur and also on the uncertainty about what the 
benefits will be. Uncertainty about the state of the world may be analyzed through the 
extended Ramsey rule, which highlights that shocks to growth are important for discounting 
only if they are persistent; transient shocks have little import. Uncertainty about the project’s 
benefits implies the need to account for benefits using certainty equivalents or a risk-adjusted 
discount rate; in each case, the adjustment for uncertainty depends on the degree of risk 
aversion and the dependence between the project consequences and aggregate economic 
growth. Recognition that human well-being depends on a variety of market and non-market 
goods, and that the relative prices of these may shift dramatically over time, leads to the 
conclusion that different goods should be discounted at different rates, and that these rates are 
interdependent; e.g., both the economic discount rate for consumption and the ecological 
discount rate for environmental consequences depend on the changes in both consumption 
and environment, and on uncertainty about these changes. 
Finally, there are both positive and normative interpretations of the discount rate. From a 
positive perspective, it is a price that is observable for short- and medium-term maturities (up 
to about 30 years), although of course it is the nominal rate that is observable; because of 
uncertainty about inflation, the real rate is not known ex ante. From a normative perspective, 
it is a measure of an intertemporal rate of substitution, which may be intrapersonal or 
intergenerational, depending on the context. There are discrepancies between the positive and 
normative perspectives that the literature has yet to resolve. The equity-premium puzzle 
highlights the large discrepancy between average returns to equity and ‘risk-free’ sovereign 
debt; the normative risk-free-rate puzzle highlights the disparity between market interest rates 
and realized economic growth, which suggests that past generations have underestimated the 
growth their investment would produce. For long-term and risky projects like climate 
mitigation, both puzzles contribute to uncertainty about the appropriate discount rate. 
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